Krauthammer on nukes

Charles Krauthammer wrote a much more reasoned editorial on the Obama Administration's new nuclear posture review than I had anticipated. No BINGO for me this time. But he's still wrong, of course.

Krauthammer argues that Obama's policy change is misguided because it signals to our enemies that they might, just might, be able to get away with a chemical or biological attack on the U.S. Deterrence worked during the Cold War, he argues - removing a bit of that deterrent increases our vulnerability to attack. He takes a gratuitous swipe at Obama's distinction between NPT-compliant and noncompliant countries:

Imagine the scenario: Hundreds of thousands are lying dead in the streets of Boston after a massive anthrax or nerve gas attack. The president immediately calls in the lawyers to determine whether the attacking state is in compliance with the NPT. If it turns out that the attacker is up to date with its latest IAEA inspections, well, it gets immunity from nuclear retaliation. (Our response is then restricted to bullets, bombs and other conventional munitions.)

However, if the lawyers tell the president that the attacking state is NPT-noncompliant, we are free to blow the bastards to nuclear kingdom come.

Silly, because we know well in advance who is NPT-compliant and who is not. No lawyers need be consulted. And every country must know that a promise not to retaliate is time-inconsistent: when push comes to shove, any president, regardless of any promises made in years past, will be under pressure to go nuclear. Finally, our 'bullets, bombs and other conventional munitions" are surely sufficient to blow 'the bastards' to non-nuclear kingdom come in any case.

Krauthammer calls Obama's policy "strategicaly loopy":

Does anyone believe that North Korea or Iran will be more persuaded to abjure nuclear weapons because they could then carry out a biological or chemical attack on the United States without fear of nuclear retaliation?

... On the contrary. The last quarter-century -- the time of greatest superpower nuclear arms reduction -- is precisely when Iran and North Korea went hellbent into the development of nuclear weapons (and India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers).

One could also argue that the last quarter-century was the time period during which our policies toward potential adversaries were most belligerent. North Korea began its drive toward nuclear weapons under the Reagan and Bush I regimes. It temporarily, partially suspended its efforts under a deal struck with the Clinton administration, then resumed development and became a nuclear power under Bush II. Iran's efforts began under Bush II. So who's to say a less belligerent approach would not be an improvement?

But here lies the fundamental problem with Krauthammer's argument. He imagines our nuclear policy as a strategic game between the US and our adversaries like Iran and North Korea. But that's not the way the Obama Administration sees it. For them, it's a game between the US and countries who might wish to develop nuclear weapons (Brazil? Saudi Arabia?) or who might tolerate the efforts of North Korea or Iran to do so (China? Russia? India?). By forswearing first use in certain cases, providing an incentive for countries to comply with NPT, reducing our arsenal, we induce those countries to cooperate with us in our nonproliferation efforts and marginalize Iran and North Korea.

Conservative critics of the Obama Administration's foreign policy have a similar blind spot in other contexts. Obama wants to put more emphasis on multilateralism and diplomacy. The critics argue, it's crazy to think that Iran, North Korea, and al Qaeda will respond to diplomacy. But the point is that Obama's policies are not directed at them, they're directed at our allies and those who can be persuaded to be our allies. The intent is not to bargain with al Qaeda and so on, but to marginalize them.